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Abstract Populist radical right (PRR) parties are on the rise in Western Europe.
Where do the electoral successes of these parties come from? First, it has been
shown that the opening of borders has fuelled the divide between the ‘losers’
and ‘winners’ of globalisation. The ‘losers’ are individuals who feel threatened by
international competition. They vote for PRR parties because they agree with
their nativist, populist and Eurosceptic positions. Second, various social and
political developments have facilitated the success of these parties. Some ex-
amples of these developments are increased electoral volatility, the ideological
convergence of the mainstream parties, and increasing immigration and
unemployment. Third, PRR parties themselves are, to a large extent, responsible
for their own successes. Without their increasingly moderated messages and
profiles, their often appealing external and internal leaders, and their well-in-
stitutionalised party organisations, their (long-term) successes would not have
been possible. Most probably, the PRR party family will remain with us for a
while.
Keywords Populism  Radical right  Euroscepticism  Anti-immigration 
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Introduction
Although populist radical right (PRR) parties have been on the rise since
approximately the mid-1990s, the elections to the European Parliament in May
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2014 were the most telling mark of their success. Parties such as the National
Front (Front National, FN) in France, the UK Independence Party in Britain and
the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) in Denmark all attracted about 25 %
of the votes and became the biggest parties within their respective countries
(Do¨ring and Manow 2015). They were not the only ones. The Freedom Party
(Partij voor de Vrijheid) in the Netherlands, The Finns (Perussuomalaiset) in
Finland, and the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs, FPO¨)
were also reasonably successful during the European elections. The day after the
elections, various media outlets were talking about a ‘political earthquake’ (see,
for instance, Parker et al. 2014).
What is going on in Western European democracies? Where has this upsurge
of PRR parties come from? Before it is possible to answer these questions, it is of
vital importance to carefully define what we are talking about when we employ
the label ‘populist radical right’. Which parties belong to the PRR party family
and why?
Defining the undefinable
Various political scientists have aimed to define the PRR party family (see Betz
1994; Kitschelt 1997; Norris 2005). This has led to considerable conceptual
fuzziness. Some talk about ‘neo-populist’ or ‘national populist’ parties, while
others refer to these parties as ‘extreme right’, ‘anti-immigrant’ or ‘xenophobic’.
The Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde (2007) coined the term ‘populist radical
right’. Scholars are increasingly employing this term and the corresponding
definition. For this reason, I will also employ Mudde’s definition.
According to Mudde (2007), PRR parties are nativist, authoritarian and
populist. Nativism can be defined as ‘an ideology, which holds that states should
be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘‘the nation’’) and that
nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the
homogeneous nation-state’ (Mudde 2007, 19). Non-native persons could be, for
instance, immigrants or people of another race or religion (Albertazzi and
McDonnell 2008). The second attitudinal element that PRR parties share is
authoritarianism. PRR parties want their society to be strictly ordered. They
therefore place strong emphasis on the importance of law and order. Violations
of the rules should be punished severely. The third main attitudinal element of
PRR parties is populism. Populism could be seen as a set of ideas according to
which the ‘good’ people are betrayed by an ‘evil’ elite (Hawkins 2010). Although
it is often rather unclear who these parties consider to be ‘the people’, they are
crystal clear about their negative attitude towards the elite (Canovan 2004). The
elite is considered to be arrogant, selfish, incompetent and often also corrupt.
This critique could be directed towards a political elite (the established political
order, the political ‘caste’), an economic elite (large companies, bankers in
general) or a cultural elite (academics, writers, intellectuals).
Today’s PRR parties are also very critical of European unification. Their
Eurosceptic attitude fits nicely with their nativist and populist outlook. Negativity
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towards immigrants from other European countries1 and the bureaucratic EU
elites who, allegedly, do not listen to the ordinary people’s concerns, can be
found among virtually all contemporary PRR parties’ programmes in Europe. It is
important, however, to emphasise that PRR parties need not be Eurosceptic.
Political parties such as the Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) in Belgium and the
FN, for instance, have not always been negative about the EU.
Although PRR parties have quite a lot of characteristics in common, they also
differ from each other in important respects. When it comes, for instance, to
attitudes towards homosexuality or foreign policy, different PRR parties can take
diametrically opposing positions. Nonetheless, it has been shown that individual
parties within the PRR party family do not differ more from each other than
parties within the conservative or liberal party families. This does not mean,
however, that they are able to successfully collaborate with each other on the
international level, as most mainstream parties do. On the contrary, many
attempts at international collaboration by PRR parties have failed.
Who votes for the PRR and why?
The reasons why people vote for PRR parties are in line with the ideological
positions of these parties. First, PRR voters agree with these parties’ nativist
outlook. It has been shown that PRR voters tend to be exclusive nationalist—
that is, nativist (Dunn forthcoming). More specifically, it has been shown that
attitudes towards immigration constitute the main motivation to vote for the
PRR (Ivarsflaten 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2000).
Second, various studies have shown that those who vote for PRR parties also
tend to be authoritarian, just like the parties themselves. They are in favour of a
strictly ordered society and severe punishment in case of violation of the law
(Lubbers 2001; Minkenberg 2000). However, a recent comparative study has
shown that this need not always be the case: an authoritarian outlook is not a
distinguishing characteristic of PRR voters in all Western European countries
(Dunn forthcoming).
Third, many cross-national comparative studies demonstrate that those who
vote for PRR parties are less satisfied with politics (Arzheimer 2009; Lubbers et al.
2002; Werts et al. 2012). Because PRR parties present themselves as political
outsiders, and claim that established parties do not listen to ordinary citizens
(Barr 2009), these parties form an attractive alternative for dissatisfied citizens. It
is important to emphasise that they need not be real political outsiders; it is
sufficient that they portray themselves as maverick outsiders. In fact, many PRR
representatives are experienced politicians. Geert Wilders of the Dutch Freedom
Party, for instance, is one of the most experienced politicians in parliament.
Fourth, various scholars have also shown that Euroscepticism is strongly
related to voting for PRR parties (Arzheimer 2009; Ivarsflaten 2005; Lubbers and
1 This is particularly true of Western European populists, who dislike immigrants from Eastern
European countries such as Poland and Romania.
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Scheepers 2007; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Werts et al. 2012). Many mainstream
parties offer moderate messages when it comes to their positions on European
integration. Citizens who are strongly Eurosceptic often have little other option
than to choose from the parties on the fringes of the political spectrum. Thus
because PRR parties present themselves especially clearly as the voice of
Eurosceptic individuals, these parties are widely supported by Eurosceptic
voters.
The general conclusion is that most individuals vote for PRR parties because
they agree with them. They make a rational decision in favour of parties that
are ideologically close to them on topics such as immigration, law and order,
European integration, and the way in which the political system functions—
they are, in other words, more than merely ‘protest voters’ (Van der Brug et al.
2000).
But why exactly do these citizens hold such attitudes? Various scholars have
argued that citizens feel threatened by increasing international competition and
growing supranational collaboration (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). These citizens are,
in general, less educated employees in traditionally protected sectors of the
labour market, who fear that they might lose their jobs and identity. They are the
‘losers of globalisation’ and their attitudes are diametrically opposed to those of
the ‘winners of globalisation’, who have positive ideas about cultural diversity
and European integration.
Facilitators of the success of PRR parties2
Political facilitators
To understand the rise of PRR parties, it is not enough to just look at those who
vote for these parties. Voter choices are also affected by external structures and
processes. To start with, voters are affected by the behaviour and the ideas of
the parties that compete with each other for their support. Various studies have
shown that PRR parties are more successful when mainstream parties converge
on centrist positions (Abedi 2002; Carter 2005; Kitschelt and McGann 1995).
Convergence basically means that centre–left parties become less left wing and
centre–right parties become less right wing. When this occurs, they create an
ideological space for PRR parties. Moreover, the greater the convergence of the
mainstream parties, the more rewarding it becomes for PRR parties to express
the populist message that the established parties can no longer be distinguished
from each other. Often convergence is caused by the coming into being of a
grand coalition containing both centre–left and centre–right parties (Arzheimer
and Carter 2006). When the most important mainstream parties come together
to form a government coalition they are forced to compromise. As a result they
2 In this section I do not discuss all the possible facilitators of PRR success. Some factors likely to exert
an effect on the success of PRR parties still need further study before definitive conclusions can be
drawn (e.g. the electoral system, the cordon sanitaire and media coverage). I focus only on those
facilitators which various studies have persuasively shown exert an effect.
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inevitably move closer together.3 In the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, the
Austrian Social Democrats and conservatives formed a grand coalition. An
important outcome of their ideological convergence was the coming into being
of an ideological space for the FPO¨. The more successful the FPO¨ became, the
more the mainstream parties needed each other, the closer they moved
together and the more fertile the breeding ground became for the FPO¨’s
populist anti-establishment message (Heinisch 2008).
External facilitators
Various other developments have facilitated the rise of PRR parties. First, several
scholars have argued that the process of globalisation has set in motion a
number of developments which have resulted in PRR successes. The theory is
that increasing supranational collaboration (both at the EU level and the global
level) has fuelled the above-mentioned distinction between the winners and the
losers of globalisation and increased the attractiveness of PRR parties to the
‘losers’ (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008).
A second process that has affected the success of PRR parties is the process of
individualisation, and, more specifically, increased electoral volatility. In the past,
most voters remained loyal to one single political party, with which they
identified strongly. Today voters in virtually all Western European countries
increasingly switch between parties from one election to the next (Drummond
2006; Van der Meer et al. 2012). Without this increased volatility, the success of
PRR parties would have been impossible. After all, it is the increased volatility
that has made the electorate ‘available’ to vote for the new PRR parties (Van
Kessel 2011). Where would the PRR electorate have come from if all voters had
stayed loyal to ‘their’ parties? Of course, electoral volatility also creates a risk for
PRR parties—as it does for mainstream parties. After all, if voters can more easily
switch to voting for PRR parties, they can also more easily switch away from
these parties.
Third, the success of PRR parties has also been ascribed to (alleged) cultural or
economic crises. Various scholars have shown that the number of immigrants in
a country affects the success of PRR parties. PRR parties become more successful
when the number of immigrants increases (Lubbers et al. 2002; Werts et al.
2012). Moreover, in combination with increasing immigration, unemployment
also appears to exert a strong (positive) effect on the success of PRR parties
(Arzheimer 2009; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Golder 2003).
PRR parties themselves
To a large extent the success of a PRR party is dependent on the PRR party itself.
The behaviour of other parties and other social structures and processes offer
possibilities and restraints for PRR parties, but the success of these parties is
3 Note that this argument also holds for left wing populist parties like The Coalition of the Radical
Left (Syriza) in Greece or We Can! (Podemos) in Spain.
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largely dependent on the political messages of the parties themselves, the
behaviour of the leaders and the strength of their organisations. In early studies
it was argued that the success of the PRR is, to a large extent, due to a new
‘winning formula’: a strongly nationalist attitude combined with socio-eco-
nomically right wing (neoliberal) positions (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Later
studies, however, have shown that many modern PRR parties do not owe their
success so much to a socio-economically right wing message as to a centrist
position on the classical left–right spectrum (De Lange 2007).4 Another reason
for PRR parties’ success is that they have created a ‘detoxified’, more modern
image (Mudde 2007), and thereby have differentiated themselves from fascists
and (neo-)Nazis (Rydgren 2005).
To get their main message across, strong external leadership is very important
to PRR parties. Prior to their electoral breakthrough, a strong and appealing
leader can make a huge difference. It is therefore important for PRR party leaders
to have strong rhetorical skills, to be media savvy and to know how to appeal to
ordinary voters (De Lange and Art 2011). Successful PRR leaders such as Jean-
Marie Le Pen (FN), Jo¨rg Haider (FPO¨), Pim Fortuyn (of Pim Fortuyn List, Lijst Pim
Fortuyn, LPF) and Umberto Bossi (of the Northern League, Lega Nord) have all
been called charismatic leaders.
Yet external leadership is not the only form of leadership that is important. In
the longer term, a party also needs a strong internal leader who takes care of the
party’s organisation, communication with activists and political personnel, and
recruitment and education (Eatwell 2004). Because most leaders do not possess
both internal and external leadership qualities, many PRR parties divide these
tasks up. A good example of this is the FN, in which, while Jean-Marie Le Pen was
the external leader, Bruno Me´gret assumed the internal leadership (Mudde 2007,
272). Of course, these leadership qualities are also important for other party
families. Yet, because mainstream party families such as liberals and conserva-
tives have much more solid electoral bases, individual leadership qualities are of
less decisive importance for them.
The organisation of a PRR party matters too. It is not so much the specific
form of organisation that affects a party’s success,5 but the degree to which a
party is institutionalised. A party is institutionalised when it is no longer a means
to an end, but an end in itself. In an institutionalised party, members identify
with the party, accept the decisions made by the leader and are loyal to the
organisation. A big problem for many new parties (including many PRR parties)
is that members and other followers support the leader of the party much more
strongly than they support the party itself. This poses a threat to the party if the
popularity of the leader dwindles or if the leader is replaced by someone else.
Indeed, research has indicated that for PRR parties it is of essential importance
that the party is institutionalised before its electoral breakthrough. A problem for
4 It is important to emphasise that this only holds for the socio-economic left–right position. When it
comes to socio-cultural issues (e.g. immigration, the EU), which are considered much more salient by
the PRR, these parties maintain their radical positions.
5 For instance, whether it is hierarchical or horizontal in structure, whether it has members or not and
whether it has local branches or is purely a centralised party.
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suddenly successful but not institutionalised parties is that they have to find
good politicians who are also loyal (De Lange and Art 2011). In contrast to the
more established parties, many new PRR parties have not had the time to do
this. For example, days after its leader Pim Fortuyn was murdered in 2002, the
LPF won 26 out of the 150 seats in the Dutch lower house, and had to deliver 26
parliamentarians—basically from nowhere. Moreover, the party also had to
recruit ministers because it had decided to participate in a government coalition.
The party was not ready for such responsibility and very soon its politicians were
fighting each other. This marked the beginning of the end for the LPF.
Conclusion
There are various reasons to expect that PRR parties will remain successful in the
years to come. First of all, their main programme topics—immigration and
European integration—will most likely remain highly salient. And as long as
these topics remain on the political and media agenda, it is likely that support
for PRR parties will remain high as well (see Walgrave and De Swert 2004).
Second, the older generation of PRR leaders with more extremist profiles (e.g.
Umberto Bossi and Jean-Marie Le Pen) has been replaced by a younger and
more moderate generation (e.g. Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini). This new
generation seems to be much more pragmatic and more prepared to cooperate
on the international level. As a result, PRR parties can learn from each other’s
success stories and mistakes. Third, public attitudes towards PRR parties are
changing (De Lange et al. 2014). The FN in particular seems to have become
increasingly mainstream and now attracts many voters who previously voted for
one of the major parties. In sum, it can be expected that the PRR party family will
remain with us for a while.
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